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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the debt 
structure of an organisation affects its demand and 
preference for monitoring costs in Malaysian business 
environment. Data is collected using primary and 
secondary sources. Multiple regression analysis is used. 
The findings indicate that debt structure have negative 
significant relationship with total monitoring costs. 
However the debt structure is not significant when the 
cost of directorship and auditing are compared. But 
when internal auditing and external auditing costs are 
compared, the result indicates that companies with high 
debt structure have significantly more external auditing 
costs. This result is consistent with prior studies and 
supports the notion that highly geared companies 
demand more external audit as the banks need the 
independent third party to verify the figures in the 
financial statements prepared by the management. 
 




Agency costs arise in a firm when managers pursue their own interests at the expense 
of the shareholders. Several mechanisms are suggested in the literature to reduce 
these costs. Among others, it is claimed that capital structure through the use of debt 
financing or leverage can help to discipline the managers and reduce the agency costs 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Fleming et al., 2005; Jensen, 1983; Harris and Raviv, 
1991,Ugurlu, 2000; Abor, 2008). In addition, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Ang et al. 
(2000) claim that debt financing provide an alternative or complementary monitoring 
mechanism to managerial equity ownership and family ownership for reducing the 
agency cost of an organisation. This is due to the fact that external financing can induce 
monitoring by lenders.  
 
Previous studies examine various dimension of debt financing in relation to other 
factors, such as debts and compensation (Bryan et al., 2005), information role of debt 
(Haris and Raviv, 1990), ownership structure and debt (Su, 2010; Berger et al., 1997; 
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Fleming et al., 2005) and debt and performance (Abor, 2007) . There are also studies 
examining the relationship of debt financing and audit fees only (Tauringana and Clarke, 
2000; Chow, 1982), but none of the studies investigate how debt financing influence the 
components of the monitoring /agency costs of an organization, and the preference 
between the components. 
 
This study attempts to examine how the debt financing of an organisation affects the 
component of its monitoring/agency costs in Malaysian organizations. This study uses 
the direct measure of agency costs, which are the cost of monitoring the companies as 
recommended by Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (FCCG, 2001), namely the 
cost of directorship, internal audit and external audit. Specifically, this study focuses on 
how the debt financing affect the demand and preferences of these three monitoring 
mechanisms as the proxy for agency costs in Malaysian organizations.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a review of the relevant literature, and 
Section 3 provides a description of the methodology used for this study. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis, and finally the last section 
concludes the study.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
Most organizations use some debt in their capital structure. Fosberg (2004) claims that 
the primary reason is due to the fact that tax deductibility of interest lower the cost of 
debt financing and makes debt capital the cheapest type of outside financing available 
to most organizations. However, the major disadvantage of debt financing is that it 
increases the risk that the organisation will go bankrupt if it cannot service its debt.  
 
It is also argued that capital structure choice may be an instrumental monitoring variable 
as it can be a bonding device triggering corporate control actions (Renneboog, 2000). 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Ang et al. (2000) claim that debt financing provide an 
alternative or complementary monitoring mechanism to managerial equity ownership 
and family ownership for reducing the agency cost of an organisation. This is due to the 
fact that external financing can induce monitoring by lenders. Financing projects 
internally avoids such monitoring. Besides that, debt may reduce agency costs by 
reducing cash flows available for expropriation and investments in negative net present 
value projects (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, Fleming et al. 
(2005) claim that compared to issuing of new equity, the issue of debt also will not dilute 
the managers’ equity holdings as a proportion of total equity, but further enhance the 
alignment of interests. Debt is also said to serve as a disciplining device because 
default allows creditors the option to force the organisation into liquidation (Harris and 
Raviv, 1990). Ang et al. (2000) claim that by incurring monitoring costs to safeguard the 
loan, banks lead organizations to operate more efficiently by better utilising assets and 
moderating perquisite consumptions in order to improve the organisation’s reported 
financial performance to the bank. As the leverage increases, so does the risk of default 
by the organisation, hence the incentive for the lenders to monitor the organisation. 




Abor (2008) claims that the relationship between the managers of the firm and the debt 
holders can be characterised as principal-agent relationship, where the firm’s 
management is the agent and both the debt holders and the shareholders are the 
principals. Direct monitoring by debt covenants and capital market participants and 
knowing that they will be subjected to continual scrutiny by these external parties  
discipline managers to avoid expropriation of shareholders wealth and provide 
incentives for managers to avoid shirking and excessive perquisite consumption (Bryan 
et al., 2005).  
 
Debt is also said to be able to generate information that can be used by investors to 
monitor and evaluate major operating decisions of the organisation in two ways. Firstly, 
the mere ability of the organisation to make its contractual payments to debt-holders 
provides information. Secondly, in the event that the organisation fails to make the 
payments, their ways to resolve the matter either through informal negotiation or formal 
bankruptcy proceeding will disseminate considerable information to the investors (Harris 
and Raviv, 1990). They further stress that debt-holders can use their legal rights to force 
management to provide information and to implement the resulting efficient liquidation 
decision.   
 
Tauringana and Clarke (2000) argue that highly geared companies have incentive to be 
audited since lenders would demand audited financial statement to approve their loans. 
They further argue that as for major creditors, since they have no legal right to access 
the company’s books and records, the audited financial statements are the best 
assurance they have of the company’s status; consequently they are more likely to 
insist on the financial statements to be audited.  
 
An organisation with high debt financing would place heavy demand on organizations 
for detailed financial disclosure to enable the debt holders to monitor the adherence of 
the debt covenants. Creditors will scrutinise the organizations to ensure that the 
covenants are not violated. The debt holders will depend on the true and fairness of the 
financial statements as certified by the auditors to ensure the validity of the value of the 
assets in the determination of payoffs to claimholders. An organisation with debt 
contracts is also said to place high importance and reliance on the accounting numbers, 
and especially so if the greater the number of different accounting measures in the 
organisation debt covenants (Chow, 1982). This notion is supported by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who argue that the creation of additional debt contract that relies on 
accounting based performance measurement creates a demand for more or higher 
quality auditing, as independence is very important. Therefore, the presence of long-
term debt contract creates a demand for higher quality audit (Eichenseher and Shields, 
1985; Palmrose, 1986) rather than directorship. Another study on New Zealand stock 
exchange companies also support this notion by claiming that the higher the leverage, 





Basically, most companies have some debts in their capital structure. Debt financing is 
considered as external financing which induce monitoring by lenders (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Ang et al., 2000). As the leverage increases, so does the risk of default, 
hence the incentive for the lenders to monitor the organisation. This is supported by a 
study by Ang et al. (2000), which finds that agency costs are lower with greater 
monitoring by banks. In addition, banks also lead organizations to operate more 
efficiently by better utilising assets and moderating perquisite consumptions in order to 
improve the organizations’ reported financial performance to the banks (Ang et al., 
2000). This is agreed by Jensen (1986) who states that the action of managers of 
organisation with high debts will be monitored by the debt holders and controlled by the 
debt contracts. This is to ensure that the managers adhere to and follow the debt 
contracts as the debt holders depend on it in the event of bankruptcy. Therefore it is 
argued that in an organisation which has high debt, managers will be more cautious in 
their actions as they realised that they are being scrutinised and monitored (Bryan et al., 
2005),  and this also spur from the need to report good performance to the bank. As a 
result there will be less expropriation of shareholders wealth, less conflict and less 
agency problem, thus leading to less monitoring needed. Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H1: The greater the debt of an organisation relative to the market value of the 




It is claimed that an organisation with high debt financing would place heavy demand for 
detailed financial disclosure to enable the debt holders to monitor the adherence of the 
debt covenants. The debt holders will depend on accounting values (Anderson et al., 
1993) and the true and fairness of the financial statements as certified by the auditors to 
ensure the validity of the value of the assets in the determination of payoffs to 
claimholders. An organisation with debt contracts is also said to place high importance 
and reliance on the accounting numbers, and especially so if the greater the number of 
different accounting measures in the organisation debt covenants (Chow, 1982). 
Furthermore debt holders have no legal rights to access the organisation’s books and 
records and the audited financial statements are the best assurance they have of the 
organisation’s status (Tauringana and Clarke, 2000). Hence, it is argued that the 
opinion of the auditors is very important to the debt holders to check on the 
management (director) of the organisation’s ability to pay its dues and ensure the 
credibility of the financial statements prepared by the management.  Therefore it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H2:   The greater the debt of an organisation relative to the market value of the 
organisation, the lower is the relative expenditure on monitoring from directorship 
compared to auditing (internal and external). 
 
As independent opinion of a third party on the financial statements to assess the 
management ‘s ability to pay is very crucial for the debt holders, they will demand and 
value the opinion of the external auditors more highly compared to those of the internal 
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auditors. This is because internal auditors are the staff of the organisation and report to 
the management of the organisation (Messier and Boh, 2004, p. 10). Even though some 
of the organizations may have outsourced their internal audit service, but they still report 
to the audit committee, which is a sub-committee to the board of directors. On the other 
hand, the external auditors are viewed to be separated and more independent from the 
management and their audit reports certify the credibility of the accounts prepared by 
the organizations for public use. These audited accounts are important information to 
the lenders in accessing the organizations’ ability to pay their dues. Therefore it is 
argued that a highly geared organisation will depend more on external auditors 
compared to internal auditors. Hence: 
 
H3:   The greater the debt of an organisation relative to the market value of the 
organisation, the lower is the relative expenditure on monitoring from internal 
auditing compared to external auditing. 
 
3.   Data and Methodology 
 
3.1   Data and sample 
 
Data for the study was collected using primary (questionnaire and interviews)  and 
secondary sources (annual reports). The population of the study includes all 867 
companies listed on the Main and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia. However, the 
companies classified under finance sector were excluded in this study because of their 
unique features and business activities, as well as differences in compliance and 
regulatory requirements (Yatim et al., 2006). The response rate was 27% , with 235 
usable samples used in the study.  
 
3.2.   Models and Variable definition 
 
There are three models to test the three hypotheses. And there are three dependent 
variables, one dependent variable for each model.  
 
The first model tests hypothesis 1 (H1): 
 
MONITORING =  αi   + b1DEBT  +   γ(Control variables)    + εi    …………….Model 1 
 
Where the dependent variable is the monitoring costs of the companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia. Directorship and auditing (internal and external) are specified as monitoring 
mechanisms in the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (FCCG, 2001). This total 
Monitoring (MONITORING) is measured by the sum of organization investment in non-
executive directors’ remunerations, internal auditors’ costs, and external auditors’ costs.  
 
The second model test hypothesis 2 (H2): 
 
DIRAUD =  αi   + b1DEBT  +   γ(Control variables)    + εi     …………….Model 2 
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Where the dependent variable is the ratio of total directors’ remuneration to total 
auditing.  This model test the hypothesis relating to the preference between directorship 
and auditing.  
 
The third model test hypothesis 3 (H3): 
 
INT EXT =  αi   + b1DEBT  +   γ(Control variables)    + εi    …………….Model 3 
 
Where the dependent variable is the ratio of the total internal audit costs to total external 
audit costs. This model test the hypothesis relating to the preference between internal 
auditing and external auditing. 
 
The independent variable in all models is the debt structure (DEBT) which is the ratio of 
the long term debt to market value of the firm. The controlled variables include in this 
study are size, complexity, risk and listing status. 
  
4.   Findings and Discussions  
 
4.1.    Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control 
variables.  The results of standard tests on skewness and kurtosis in Table 1 indicate 
that there is no problem with normality assumption‡. Thus, these variables can 
reasonably be considered as normally distributed. Table 2 presents pairwise correlation 
coefficient of all variables. The result indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem, 
as the correlations are below the threshold value of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359). 
 
Table 1 :  Descriptive summary statistics  







MONITORING 12.9841 10.9491 16.8605 1.0005 0.864 0.922 
DIRAUD 9.7291 0.1076 38.2952 7.4972 1.190 1.516 
INTEXT 0.5959 0.0000 2.2210 0.4098 1.437 2.777 
DEBT 0.1468 0.0000 0.93283 0.1584 1.86 4.366 
SIZE 19.744 16.720 24.8991 1.4171 0.911 0.887 
REVINV 0.3088 0.0019 0.8046 0.1945 0.329 -0.888 
COMPLEX 2.4998 0.0000 6.0981 0.9091 0.232 1.430 
RISK 0.2000 0 1 0.3980 1.544 0.386 
LISTSTAT 0.7400 0 1 0.4370 -1.130 -0.731 
              
Variable definition: 
MONITORING = Total monitoring costs(ln); SIZE = Total assets(ln); RECINV = Ratio of inventories and 
receivables to total assets; COMPLEX = number of subsidiaries(ln); RISK = Current year loss(Dummy); 
LISTSTAT = Board listing (Dummy) 
                                                   
‡
 The data is said to be normal if the standard skewness is within  ±1.96 and standard kurtosis is between   ±3.0 (Mat 
Nor and Sulong, 2007; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
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MONITOR 1.00                
DIRAUD -.389*** 1.00 
 
             
INTEXT .301** -.371*** 1.00 
 
      
DEBT .241*** -.149** -.041 
 
1.00           
SIZE .82*** -.318 *** 0.212*** -.418*** 1.00 
 
        
RECINV -.212*** .170*** .013 -.370*** 
 
-.397*** 1.00       
COMPLEX .605*** -.224*** -.045 
 
.224*** .523*** -.143** 1.00     
RISK -.246*** -.123* -.062 
 
.073 -.233*** .005 -.039 1.00   




 Notes:    *** significant at 1% level;   ** significant at 5% level ;    * significant at 10% level 
(See variable definition in Table 1) 
 
4.2   Results 
 
The data was analyzed using multiple regression analysis. Table 3 presents the results 
for all the three models.  
 
Column two of Table 3 presents the multiple regression analysis used to test the model 
1. The adjusted R squared for the model is 0.743 and the F-value of 113.825 is 
significant (p <0.000).  The result indicates that the debt structure is significant and  
negatively related to the total monitoring costs. This result implies that as the ratio of 
long term debt to the market value of the organisation increases, the total monitoring 
costs will decrease; hence, hypothesis H1 is supported. This result is consistent the 
findings from earlier studies by Ang et al. (2000) and Jensen (1986). This result support 
the notion that debt financing is an alternative or complementary monitoring mechanism 
as it can induce monitoring by lenders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Ang et al., 2000). 
Debt is also said to serve as a disciplining device because default allows creditors the 
option to force the organisation into liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990), continual 
scrutiny by these external monitors provide incentives for managers to avoid shirking 
and excessive perquisite consumption (Bryan et al., 2005), where managers tend to 
ensure that organizations are being operated more efficiently by better utilising assets 
and moderating perquisite consumptions in order to improve the organisation’s reported 




This finding is supported by the telephone interviews with several bank officers in 
charge of approval and monitoring of loans in a few principal banks in Malaysia. Among 
others, they claim that: 
 
“There is stricter regulation after the financial year crisis 1997/98 imposed by the 
bank to our clients compared to those before the crisis” 
 “We will be stricter when approving and evaluating loans for public companies 
compared to private companies” 
“Generally, we will monitor all our clients through our computerised system which 
will trigger a warning if there is any problem relating to a client. And as the bank 
margin is greater and the risk is higher for clients with big amount of loan, we will 




The above finding and the interview results suggests that high borrowing encourages 
banks and creditors to play a monitoring role in Malaysian companies. And it appears 
that the financial crisis in 1997/1998 affect the bank evaluation and monitoring of their 
clients. A lot of banks throughout the world are closed and / or forced to merge in order 
to survive. The same scenario happens in Malaysia. As a result, the shareholders and 
lenders are more alert and watchful to make sure that their interests in the companies 
are protected. Thus, this negatively significant result in this study may be explained by 
the fact that, learning from their experience and the downfalls during the crisis, coupled 
with the regulations introduced after the crisis motivate the lenders to be more alert and 
play a more proactive monitoring role. And all 5 interviewees also agree that more 
attention will be given to their clients with higher amount of loan as this will involve 
higher risk for the bank.   
 
However, Debt structure variable in Model 2 (column three of Table 3) is not significant, 
thus hypothesis H2 is not supported. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) claim that firms and 
banks/ debt holders have close relationship in Malaysia. The debt holders may stress 
for lesser monitoring cost as indicated in the significant result in Model 1, as they have 
to bear a portion of such costs, especially in the event of bankruptcy, as happened 
during and after the financial crisis 1997/98. But in Malaysian business environment, it 
is argued that, couple with their close relationship with the management and the trust 
they put in them, the debt holders may not be very concern of the preference between 
directorship and auditing as long as the monitoring work is done and their interest is 
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Notes:    *** significant at 1% level;   ** significant at 5% level ;    * significant at 10% level  
(See variable definition in Table 1) 
 
The result in column four of Table 3 indicates that debt structure variable (DEBT) is 
significant in Model 3. This result implies that as the ratio of the long term debt to the 
market value increase, the organisation would invest more in external audit compared to 
internal audit as its monitoring mechanism, thus, hypothesis H3 is supported. This 
finding is consistent with earlier studies by Tauringana and Clarke (2000), Chow (1982) 
and Firth and Smith (1992). 
 
This result supports the argument that an organisation with high debt financing would 
place heavy demand on the detailed financial disclosure to enable the debt holders 
monitor the adherence of the debt covenants, and the audited financial statements are 
the best assurance that the debt-holders have of the organisation’s status as they have 
no legal right to access the organisation’s books and records (Tauringana and Clarke, 
2000). An organisation with debt contracts is also said to place high importance and 
reliance on the accounting numbers (Chow, 1982), and this reliance on accounting 
based performance measurement creates a demand for more or higher quality auditing 





5.   Conclusion  
 
The major purpose of this study is to investigate how the debt structure of an 
organisation affects its demand and preference for monitoring costs in Malaysian 
business environment. The results indicate that as the debts of organizations increase 
the monitoring costs decrease, this findings suggest that as the debts increase, 
managers are more alert as they realizes that the banks are monitoring them. However 
the debt structure is not significant when the cost of directorship and auditing are 
compared. But when internal auditing and external auditing costs are compared, the 
result indicates that companies with high debt structure significantly have more external 
auditing costs. This result is consistent with prior studies and supports the notion that 
highly geared companies require more external audit as the banks need the 
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